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 III 
PREFACE 
 
The objective of this book is to present and discuss the frameworks that affect the 
demand for audit services. Knowledge of the theories discussed in this book are 
fundamental to everyone studying auditing and accounting. While most of the 
“normal” auditing text books focus on what the auditors do and how they do it, 
this book goes one step back and examines why auditors exist in the first place. 
The author believes that by knowing the theories and factors affecting existence 
and the demand for audit services, the understanding of what and why certain 
things are done by auditors is deepened. 
This book is structured in the following way. In “Part I” the theories of auditing 
are presented. The main focus here is on agency theory because it is the most 
prominent of the existing theories. In the latter half of “Part I” the factors affect-
ing the demand for financial information and auditing are discussed. This per-
spective is important because it helps the reader better understand, for example, 
why different companies or users demand different levels of information or assur-
ance. 
The purpose of “Part II” is to illustrate what implications auditing, particularly 
audit reporting, may have. This section examines the usefulness of audit reports to 
financial statement users by examining evidence from the stock markets and deci-
sion making processes. 
To activate the reader each chapter is preceded by a statement of the learning ob-
jects. These are matters that the author thinks that the reader should know after 
reading the chapter. In addition, each chapter is followed by discussion questions. 
The chapter does not necessarily give a direct answer to these questions, but 
rather, they are questions that arise from the issues discussed. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A theory is defined in Encyclopædia Britannica as follows: 
 
Scientific Theory. (2010). In Encyclopædia Britannica.  Retrieved February 
10, 2010, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online: 
http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9066294 
“systematic ideational structure of broad scope, conceived by the human 
imagination, that encompasses a family of empirical (experiential) laws 
regarding regularities existing in objects and events, both observed and 
posited. A scientific theory is a structure suggested by these laws and is 
devised to explain them in a scientifically rational manner.” 
 
Theories on the demand for auditing provide a general framework for auditing, or 
at least for understanding it. Mautz and Sharaf (1961) define the purpose of the-
ory in the following way: “One reason, then, for a serious and substantial inves-
tigation into the possibility and nature of auditing theory is the hope that it will 
provide us with solutions or, at least, clues to solutions, of problems which we 
now find difficult”.  
For example, auditing theory helps explain why auditing is needed in the first 
place. What is the role or purpose the audit process is having in the communica-
tion between a company and its environment? Furthermore, auditing theory at-
tempts to explain why some of the postulates and key concepts of auditing are so 
important (see Mautz and Sharaf 1961; Flint 1988). Auditing theory also uncovers 
some of the laws that govern the audit process and its activities. Finally, it pro-
vides us with a framework for understanding the relationships and interrelation-
ships between different parties of a firm. 
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR AUDITING  
 
 
	


1. Recognize four theories for auditing. 
2. Recognize where and how these proposed theories overlap, coincide 
or conflict. 
3. Recognize three different roles for auditing 
4. Understand how the different roles affect the perceived purpose of 
auditing. 
5. Understand how the different roles affect the perceived role of the 
auditor. 
 
 
 
2.1 Theories of auditing 
There are several different theories that may explain the demand for audit 
services. Some of them are well known in research and some of them are more 
based on perceptions. Figure 1 illustrates four audit theories according to Hayes et 
al. (2005). 
The policeman theory claims that the auditor is responsible for searching, 
discovering and preventing fraud. In the early 20
th
 century this was certainly the 
case. However, more recently the main focus of auditors has been to provide 
reasonable assurance and verify the truth and fairness of the financial statements. 
The detection of fraud is, however, still a hot topic in the debate on the audior’s 
responsibilities, and typically after events where financial statement frauds have 
been revealed, the pressure increases on increasing the responsibilities of auditors 
in detecting fraud. 
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Figure 1.   Four theories of auditing (Hayes et al. 2005) 
 
The lending credibility theory suggests that the primary function of the audit is to 
add credibility to the financial statements. In this view the service that the 
auditors are selling to the clients is credibility. Audited financial statements are 
seen to have elements that increase the financial statement users’ confidence in 
the figures presented by the management (in the financial statement). The users’ 
are percieved to gain benefits from the increased credibility, these benefits are 
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typically considered to be that the quality of investment decisions improve when 
they are based on reliable information. 
The theory of inspired confidence (Theory of rational expectations) (Limperg 
1932) addresses both the demand and the supply for audit services. The demand 
for audit services is the direct consequence of the participation of third parties 
(interested parties of a company) in the company. These parties demand 
accountability from the management, in return for their investments in the 
company. 
Accountability is realized through the issuance of periodic financial reports. 
However, since this information provided by the management may be biased, and 
outside parties have no direct means of monitoring, an audit is required to assure 
the reliability of this information. With regard to the supply of audit assurance, 
Limperg (1932) suggests that the auditor should always strive to meet the public 
expectations. 
Agency theory (Watts and Zimmerman 1978, 1986a, 1986b) suggests that the 
auditor is appointed in the interests of both the third parties as well as the 
management. A company is viewed as a web of contracts. Several groups 
(suppliers, bankers, customers, employees etc.) make some kind of contribution to 
the company for a given price. The task of the management is to coordinate these 
groups and contracts and try to optimize them: low price for purchased supplies, 
high price for sold goods, low interest rates for loans, high share prices and low 
wages for employees. In these realationships, management is the agent, which 
tries to gain contributions from principals (bankers, shareholders, employees etc).  
The most prominent and widely used audit theory is the agency theory. 
Consequently, chapter three will focus on discussing issues that arise from the 
principal-agent relationship. Before that the framework for audit theory is 
presented next. 
2.2  The role of the audit 
In the previous section four theories of auditing were presented. Related, and to 
some extent overlapping, with these theories Wallace (1980) proposed three 
hypotheses for explaining the role of the audit in free and regulated markets: the 
monitoring hypothesis, the information hypothesis and the insurance hypothesis. 
Next these three roles will each be described to provide an overview of the 
different roles auditing can take in different environments. 
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2.2.1 The monitoring hypothesis 
The monitoring hypothesis assumes that when delegating decision-making power 
to one party, as suggested in agency theory, the agent is motivated to agree to be 
monitored if the benefits from such activities exceed the related costs. This 
hypothesis is applicable to all co-operative relationships in any organization, not 
only relationships between owners and managers, but also in relationships 
between employers and employees, creditors and shareholders, different levels of 
management in companies and government and taxpayers. (Wallace 1980 and 
1987) 
Beaver (1989) pointed out that the monitoring theory strives to solve problems 
that arise due to moral hazard and information asymmetry between the agent and 
the principal. Moral hazard is the problem of the agent possessing superior 
information and thus having the opportunity to use it self-interestedly at the 
expense of the principal (Beaver 1989). Arrow (1985) calls the two types of 
principal-agent problems hidden action (moral hazard) and hidden information 
(information asymmetry). 
Public disclosures have been seen as one way of controlling the monitoring 
hypothesis. They have been seen as restricting the superior information position 
of management. Further, an independent actor can be contracted to inspect the 
information environment. From this point of view, auditing is one form of 
controlling for the monitoring hypothesis. The audit reduces the agent’s chances 
to withhold material information from the shareholders (Beaver 1989).  
The relationship between the auditor and the board of directors is one factor that 
affects the monitoring of management. The auditor and the board of directors 
usually have a relationship, which is considered to increase the monitoring power 
of the owners. Furthermore, the independent audit committees are considered to 
be a mechanism that enhances the auditor’s independent position in negotiations 
and increases the effectiveness and quality of the audit engagement (Ng and Tan 
2003). Recent updates in control environment regulation for public companies 
have imposed higher demands on the independence and expertise of board 
members. Similarly, the auditors and the management are now mandated to issue 
internal control reports, which again increases and strengthens the monitoring role 
of the auditor over the management. 
Wallace (1980, 1987 and 2004) brings forward many factors implying that 
auditing is a highly valued monitoring system among stockholders, creditors, and 
top management. For example, Chow (1982) finds that companies with a higher 
ratio of total debt to total assets or companies with more accounting based 
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covenants are more likely to hire an auditor, presumably to address the agency 
relationship of management to creditors. Additionally, evidence suggests that the 
likelihood of voluntarily hiring an auditor increases with the number of 
employees (Hay and Davis 2004). The value of auditiong of management may 
also be explained by the management’s loss organizational control (Abdel-Khalik 
1993). In companies with more employees or more complex organizational 
structure, maagement may benefir from audit in the sense that it is an additional 
meand for improving internal control. 
2.2.2 The information hypothesis 
Financial reporting was earlier seen to be central to the monitoring purposes, but 
since the 1960’s the focus moved to needs and the provision of information to 
enable users to take economic decisions (Higson 2003). Therefore, an alternative 
or complement to the monitoring hypothesis is the information hypothesis. One 
argument regarding the demand for audited financial statements is that they 
provide information that is useful in investors’ decision-making. Investment 
decision models in the finance literature value a company by calculating the net 
present value of future cash flows. For example, future cash flows have been 
observed to be highly correlated with financial statement information. Therefore, 
the audit is valued by investors as a means of improving the quality of financial 
information. (Wallace 1980, 1987 and 2004) 
Some of the same information that is used in monitoring contracts is also useful in 
making investment decisions. The difference from monitoring purposes, however, 
is that installing means of monitoring usually requires explicit contracting, as is 
the case when the agent commits to providing audited financial statements. 
However, the information hypothesis emphasizes that financial information is 
needed by investors to determine market values, which are means of making 
rational investment decisions, even in the absence of an explicit contract with the 
agent. (Wallace 1980) 
Fama and Laffer (1971) discuss three major benefits of information: reduction of 
risk, improvement of decision-making and earnings of trading profits. Audited 
financial statements can be related to each benefit. Investors tend to be risk 
adverse, so they will demand a higher return for higher levels of risk or they will 
pay a higher price in the form of a risk premium to reduce the level of uncertainty 
or risk (Fama et al. 1971). For a simple example let us assume that the risk 
premium represents an individual assessment of how much an audit will reduce 
uncertainty concerning reported financial information. The audit can be regarded 
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as cost-effective if the risk premium of each individual investor exceeds the cost 
of the audit to the company. (Wallace 1980, 1987, 2004) 
An audit is also valued as a means of improving the financial data used by 
managers in decision-making. An auditor can improve the quality of the input 
data by finding errors and by making employees more careful in preparing 
records. More accurate data will improve internal decision-making. External use 
of more accurate data for credit and investment analysis, labor negotiations or 
regulation decisions will also improve managers’ performance. (Wallace 1980, 
1987, 2004) 
The third use of information refers to gains from trade by investors with private 
information. According to the efficient market hypothesis asset prices reflect all 
publicly available information. Hence, no abnormal returns can be gained by 
using publicly available information. The information benefit of profits from 
trading is only realized by investors with private access to new information. The 
Securities Act require that audited financial statements are made publicly 
available. At the public announcement of the audit results, the price of the 
securities will adjust to the information (e.g. Chen et al. 2000; Taffler et al. 2004) 
if the information is relevant and not already known or expected. It may also be 
that no price adjustment will result from the announcement of audit results, the 
same conclusions could have been reached by outsiders at an earlier date or the 
audit results could be replaced by available surrogate information. Therefore, the 
audit function can be evaluated with respect to the benefit of trading gains. In 
other words the announced audit findings may only confirm investors’ 
expectations and existing market valuations. However, the absence of gains from 
trade on audit results does not imply lack of value for audited information. 
(Wallace 1980, 1987) 
The role of the audited data is confirmed by research results (Beaver et al. 1970) 
which demonstrate an improvement in the estimation of risk through the use of 
accounting information. The improved estimation of risk does not mean that 
abnormal earnings could be gained, but suggests that investors have more 
accurate information for evaluating investments (Wallace 1980 and 2004). The 
perceived credibility of accounting information has been observed to have an 
effect on interest costs (Wallace 2002), underpricing of initial public offerings 
(Menon and Williams 1991; Hogan 1997; Willenborg 1999) and bankruptcy 
(Menon and Williams 1994). 
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2.2.3 The insurance hypothesis 
The third hypothesis on how the demand for audits evolves relates to manage-
ment’s liability exposure (Wallace 1980). Under the Securities Act, the auditor 
and the auditee are jointly and severally liable to third parties for losses 
attributable to defective financial statements. The ability to shift financial 
responsibility for reported data to an auditor lowers the expected loss from 
litigation or related settlements to managers, creditors and other professionals 
involved in the securities market. As potential litigation costs increase the 
insurance demand from managers and professional participants for an audit can 
be expected to grow. (Wallace 1980, 1987, 2004) 
To the question why managers and other professionals look for insurance from 
auditors rather than an insurance company, four possible explanations have been 
proposed. First, the audit function is so firmly established in society that the 
decision of management not to hire an auditor would strongly imply negligence or 
fraud on the part of the managers of other professionals. Second, accounting firms 
have established in-house legal departments to defend them in professional 
liability suits. Audits have been seen as possibly providing more efficient 
insurance coverage as a co-defendant, than the insurance company as a third 
party. Third, the auditor facing a litigation suit is concerned about his/her 
reputation. Similarly, managers are concerned about their own reputation and the 
company’s reputation as a well-run company. The insurance company on the 
contrary will make decisions on a litigation suit as a cost-benefit choice between 
out of court settlement of legal defense. Thus, the auditor and the manager share a 
common interest in properly considering the effect of the litigation on the 
reputation of the parties involved.  
Fourth, auditors have “deep pockets” relative to a bankrupt or failing company 
that cannot pay. Based on court decisions to hold auditors liable for inaccurate 
financial reporting, auditors are apparently viewed as a means of socializing the 
risk. This means that auditors spread the cost of client’s business failures to other 
clients through higher fees and to the society through higher prices and lower 
returns on investment.  
O’Reilly, Leitch and Tuttle (2006) show that the going concern audit report 
information is assessed less negatively when the environment perceives the 
auditor to provide some insurance. Similarly, Lennox (1999) concludes that the 
larger auditors with “deeper pockets” are more prone to litigation despite the 
higher quality that they provide, and thus this is interpreted as confirming the 
existence of an insurance effect on the demand for auditing. Finally, Menon et al. 
(1994) also find evidence that auditors are seen by investors as guarantors of 
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financial statement quality and of their investments. Furthermore, investors also 
appear to be willing to pay a premium for the right to recover losses from the 
auditor. 
 
				
	
 
DQ 1. How do you think that time and changes in the business environment has 
affected the applicability of the four theories? 
DQ 2. What existing corporate governance structures or mechanisms can you 
think of that can be explained using the same theories than auditing? 
DQ3. Think of the three roles of auditing discussed previously. In which 
circumstances would it be understandable that an auditor is not engaged? 
DQ4.  What are the benefits of high quality information?  
DQ5.  Think of the different ways there are for the management to increase the 
percieved quality of the information that they disclose? 
DQ6.  Can you think of different auditor characteristics that signal a higher or 
lower information quality. 
DQ7.  Based on the propositions of the insurance hypothesis, how does the 
restriction of the auditors’ liablility for financial losses (as recommended 
in the European Union Eight Directive) affect the demand for audit 
services? 
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3  KEY CONCEPTS OF AGENCY THEORY 
 
 
 
	


 
1. Understand the contractual structure of a company 
 
2. Understand what an agent and a principal are. 
 
3. Understand the basic elements of an agency relationship 
 
4. Understand what is meant by conflict of interest, information 
asymmetry, and agency costs 
  
 
 
 
3.1  Contracting view of the company 
In economic theory the term “company” was first defined by Coase (1937) as 
consisting of a system of relationships which come into existence when the direc-
tion of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur. The paper suggests that operat-
ing in an open market and using the market price mechanism involves costs. In 
addition, the costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each ex-
change transaction are not eliminated when there is a company, but rather that 
they are reduced. The paper thus concludes that the advantage of forming an or-
ganization to direct the resources is cost-saving. Jensen (1983) elaborates further 
that these contracts specify the performance evaluation system, the reward system 
and the decision rights within the organization. 
Furthermore, Coase (1937) specifies in his research why some activities are han-
dled by companies and others by open markets. This study led the way to research 
to further examine the characteristics of the company. Alchian and Demsetz 
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(1972) explain that there are circumstances or different kinds of organizational 
arrangements under which the cost of managing resources in a company is lower 
than the cost of allocating resources through market transactions. 
The company is identified by Alchian et al. (1972) as a contractual structure with 
joint input production, several input owners and one party who is common to all 
the contracts of the joint inputs. This party last mentioned is empowered to rene-
gotiate any contract independently of contracts with other input owners; addition-
ally that party holds the residual claim and has the right to sell his/her central con-
tractual status. This central party is the owner. 
3.2  Defining agency theory 
By definition, agency theory attempts to describe a relationship where one party 
(the principal) delegates work to another (the agent). Furthermore, it is concerned 
with resolving the problems in a relationship with conflict of interests and risk 
sharing when attitudes toward risk diverge (Eisenhardt 1989). The Encyclopedia 
Britannica defines “financial agency theory” in the following manner:  
Agency Theory, Financial. (2010). In Encyclopædia Britannica.  Re-
trieved February 10, 2010, from Encyclopædia Britannica Online: 
http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9439355 
“in organizational economics, a means of assessing the work being 
done for a principal (i.e., an employer) by an agent (i.e., an em-
ployee). While consistent with the concept of agency traditionally ad-
vanced by legal scholars and attorneys, the economic variants of 
agency theory emphasize the costs and benefits of the principal-agent 
relationship. While a beneficial agency cost is one that increases a 
shareholder's value, an unwanted agency cost occurs when manage-
ment actions conflict with shareholder interests. Such would be the 
case when managers put their own interests ahead of an owner's inter-
ests (e.g., manipulating short-term earnings at the expense of long-
term performance in order to receive a bonus). Ongoing analyses of 
agency costs are a common managerial tool, especially in corpora-
tions that are managed by nonowners, because they serve to indicate 
whether—or how well—a manager (agent) is fulfilling his fiduciary 
obligation to an owner (principal).” 
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The development of agency theory has resulted in two strands of literature which 
address the same problem: positive agency theory and principal-agent –theory 
(Jensen 1983). According to Jensen (1983) and Eisenhardt (1989), positivist re-
search has focused almost exclusively on the relationship between the owner and 
the manager in public companies. Above all, positivist literature aims at identify-
ing situations where the interests diverge and describing instruments that limit the 
agent’s opportunistic behavior. Eisenhardt (1989) acknowledges the particular 
influence of three articles on the positivist agency literature: Jensen et al. (1976) 
on the ownership structure of the corporation, Fama (1980) on the role of efficient 
capital markets in controlling the behavior of managers and finally Fama and Jen-
sen (1983) on the role of board of directors as a monitoring instrument. 
The principal-agent literature has concentrated on modeling the general relation-
ships between the principal and the agent (Jensen 1983). As a result the theory is 
more applicable e.g. to employer-employee, buyer-supplier and other agency rela-
tionships. Consequently, the literature is generally more mathematically orien-
tated than is the positive agency literature (Eisenhardt 1989). Furthermore, Eisen-
hardt (1989) describes the heart of principal-agent theory as the trade-off between 
the cost of measuring the agent’s behavior and the cost of measuring outcomes 
and transferring risk to the agent. 
A general description of an agency relationship states that it is a contract under 
which one or more principals engage another person or persons as their agent(s) 
to perform some service on their behalf. To enable this performance, delegation 
of some decision making authority to the agent is needed (Jensen et al. 1976). As 
previously mentioned, the financial accounting literature focuses mainly on the 
positive agency literature, i.e. the relationship between the owner and the man-
ager. However, as Wallace (1980) suggests, this relationship is also easy to ob-
serve between other actors such as employers-employees, creditors-shareholders, 
government-taxpayers, as the principal-agent theory illustrates. 
The standard positive agency theory involves a principal (owner) contracting an 
agent (manager) to act on his/her behalf. As Jensen et al. (1976) explain, contract-
ing involves delegating decision making authority to the agent. This distinguishes 
ownership from control. If both parties to the relationship strive to maximize their 
utility, there is the possibility that an agent will choose to act in his/her own inter-
ests, not in those of the principals, this results in conflict of interest -problems 
(Jensen et al. 1976). To limit the divergences from his/her own interests, the prin-
cipal has the option of setting up incentives for the agent and limiting the conflict-
ing activities of the agent by establishing appropriate means of control to mitigate 
conflicts of interests (Jensen et al. 1976). 
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As a conclusion to the description above, it can be noted that agency theory views 
the company as a network of contracts. This view constitutes one of the major 
foundations of theoretical accounting. The theory helps to understand and explain 
the behavior of business actors. Ross (1973) and Jensen et al. (1976) developed 
the theory of ownership structure of a company. This theory is developed on the 
basis of a distinction between ownership and control. From this point of view, the 
positive agency literature examines the use of information for contracting pur-
poses, for example, how information can be used to persuade the manager to act 
in the interests of the owner (Ng 1978). 
According to Eisenhardt (1989) agency theory focuses on resolving two problems 
occurring in the agency relationship: agency problems and the problem of risk 
sharing. An agency problem occurs when the interests of the principal and agent 
conflict and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor the agent’s 
actions. On the other hand, a problem of risk sharing occurs when the principal 
and agent have different attitudes towards risk.  
Agency costs are the expenses incurred due to the contracting process (Adams 
1994). The principal can, in general, reduce agency costs by monitoring. How-
ever, monitoring may also involve costs. Fama et al. (1983) define agency costs 
as the costs of structuring, monitoring and bonding a set of contracts among 
agents with conflicting interests. Agency costs also include the costs due to the 
fact that it is not appropriate to monitor all contracts perfectly (Jensen 1983). Ad-
ams (1994) observes that, in order to ensure the optimal level of interest align-
ment and information asymmetry, both principals and agents will incur contract-
ing costs. For example, principals will incur monitoring costs from subjecting the 
financial statements to external audits. Agents, on the other hand, incur costs e.g. 
for external financial reporting and internal controls (Adams 1994).  
Alchian et al. (1972) note that the theory of rational expectations underlies the 
demand for monitoring. This concept expects actors to take into account all avail-
able information that influences the outcome of their decisions, and that they use 
this information intelligently and therefore do not make systematic mistakes. In 
other words, principals cannot be consistently deceived by agents.  
According to Alchian et al. (1972) the main implication of rational expectations 
theory for agents is that principals foresee the divergence between the interests of 
principals and agents. Therefore, the principals will insist on compensation for the 
risk of loss they perceive through adjustment of the agent’s wage (Wallace 1980 
and 1987). This causes the agent, rather than the principal, to reduce agency costs 
and the demand for monitoring activities (Alchian et al. 1972). 
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3.3  Conflict of interests 
By definition, a conflict of interest is a situation where an individual or an organi-
zation, an agent, has multiple interests and of those interests one could possibly 
corrupt the motivation for an act in the other. Generally, a conflict of interest pre-
supposes a circumstance where the agent is entrusted with some impartiality (ob-
jectivity or independence). The presence of a conflict of interest is independent 
from the execution of impropriety. Therefore, a conflict of interest can be discov-
ered and voluntarily defused before any corruption occurs.  
As an illustrative example of conflict of interest, think of a self-dealing conflict of 
interest -situation when a government official responsible for computer equip-
ment purchases, decides to enter into an transaction with a company that the offi-
cial owns himself. As a result the decision maker is on the both sides of the trans-
action: buyer and supplier. In accounting and auditing contexts conflict of interest 
usually refers to the conflicts between shareholders’ and managers’ objectives in 
agency relationships (see Figure 2 below) 
As noted, if in an agency relationship ownership is separated from control and 
both agent and principal strive to maximize their own utility, this will result in 
conflict of interests (Jensen et al. 1976). Studies on managerial compensation 
have generally found that company size increases manager remuneration (Jensen 
and Murphy 1990; Conyon and Murphy 2000). This provides management with 
an incentive to focus on company size growth, rather than growth in shareholder 
returns. Managers also tend to pursue growth by diversifying, which reduces 
management’s industry specific risk and strengthens their job security. However, 
Lang and Stulz (1994) find that shareholder returns are greater in undiversified 
companies and they also show that the value of the companies is reduced as they 
diversify further. 
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Figure 2.  Conflict of interest between shareholders and managers (Soltani 
2007) 
 
According to Jensen (1986, 1989), managers of low growth and high free cash 
flow companies in particular are involved in non value-maximizing activities. 
Managers increase perquisite consumption and compensation as well as manipu-
lation of accounting numbers at the expense of shareholders (Jensen 1989; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Lang, Stulz and Walking 1991; Christie and Zimmer-
mann 1994). For a company to operate efficiently and maximize shareholder 
value, free cash flow must be distributed to shareholders rather than retained (Jen-
sen 1989). Accordingly, Jensen (1986) concludes that the agency costs are higher 
for companies with low growth and high free cash flow.  
The free cash flow hypothesis is further extended by considering the effects of 
separating ownership from control. Following theories from Jensen et al. (1976) 
and Jensen (1986) on the separation of ownership and control, agency costs of 
free cash flow are more likely to occur in companies with low management own-
ership. This is because managers’ interests are more aligned with shareholders’ 
interests when they own shares in the company. Agrawal and Jayaraman (1994) 
argue that the agency costs of free cash flow are a decreasing function of man-
agement ownership. 
If agency costs are higher in low growth – high free cash flow companies, this 
would imply greater demand for monitoring on the part of the principal and there-
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fore the relevance of auditing could also be greater. This phenomenon is expected 
to be present particularly in companies where ownership is separated from control 
as Gul et al. (1998, 2001) proposed.  
High level of free cash flow is also suggested to affect the assessment of the in-
herent risk, i.e. the risk of a material misstatement in the unaudited financial state-
ments by the auditor (Gul et al. 1998, 2001). Firms with agency problems caused 
by free cash flow are thus likely to pay higher audit fees (Gul et al. 2001; 
Nikkinen et al. 2004). Gul et al. (2001) also suggest that the positive association 
between free cash flow and audit fees is stronger for companies with low levels of 
management ownership. However, this association is weaker in companies with 
high levels of debt (Gul et al. 2001). 
3.4 Information asymmetry 
An agency theory perspective also suggests that the principal-agent relationship 
may be associated with information asymmetry. The agent, as the party with 
greater involvement in the company, has access to information which may not be 
available for the principal without cost. The agent has the opportunity to use this 
information to his/her own advantage. This generates the need for regulated ac-
counting and financial reporting. 
The signaling theory, which is based on the “lemon problem” (Akerlof 1970), is a 
suitable theory in explaining how the information asymmetry affects the volun-
tary supply of financial information. First, here’s how Akerlof (1970) illustrated 
the existence and implications of information asymmetry:  
 
Akerlof, George A. (1970). THE MARKET FOR "LEMONS": 
QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND THE MARKET MECHANISM. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84 Issue 3. 
pp. 489–490: 
“The example of used cars captures the essence of the problem. From 
time to time one hears either mention of or surprise at the large price 
difference between new cars and those which have just left the show-
room. The usual lunch table justification for this phenomenon is the 
pure joy of owning a "new" car. We offer a different explanation. 
Suppose (for the sake of clarity rather than reality) that there are just 
four kinds of cars. There are new cars and used cars. There are good 
18      Proceedings of the University of Vaasa. Teaching Aid Series 
cars and bad cars (which in America are known as "lemons").  A new 
car may be a good car or a lemon, and of course the same is true of 
used cars.  
The individuals in this market buy a new automobile without knowing 
whether the car they buy will be good or a lemon. But they do know 
that with probability q it is a good car and with probability (1 — q) it 
is a lemon; by assumption, q is the proportion of good cars produced 
and (1 —q) is the proportion of lemons.  
After owning a specific car, however, for a length of time, the car 
owner can form a good idea of the quality of this machine; i.e., the 
owner assigns a new probability to the event that his car is a lemon. 
This estimate is more accurate than the original estimate. An asymme-
try in available information has developed: for the sellers now have 
more knowledge about the quality of a car than the buyers. But good 
cars and bad cars must still sell at the same price — since it is impos-
sible for a buyer to tell the difference between a good car and a bad 
car. It is apparent that a used car cannot have the same valuation as a 
new car — if it did have the same valuation, it would clearly be ad-
vantageous to trade a lemon at the price of new car, and buy another 
new car, at a higher probability q of being good and a lower probabil-
ity of being bad. Thus the owner of a good machine must be locked in. 
Not only is it true that he cannot receive the true value of his car, but 
he cannot even obtain the expected value of a new car. 
Gresham's law has made a modified reappearance. For most cars 
traded will be the "lemons," and good cars may not be traded at all. 
The "bad" cars tend to drive out the good (in much the same way that 
bad money drives out the good). But the analogy with Gresham's law 
is not quite complete: bad cars drive out the good because they sell at 
the same price as good cars; similarly, bad money drives out good be-
cause the exchange rate is even. But the bad cars sell at the same price 
as good cars since it is impossible for a buyer to tell the difference be-
tween a good and a bad car; only the seller knows. In Gresham's law, 
however, presumably both buyer and seller can tell the difference be-
tween good and bad money. So the analogy is instructive, but not 
complete.”  
The takeaway from the “lemons” -theory at this stage is that if the quality of the 
car cannot be signaled to the purchaser, good and bad cars sell for the same price. 
As a result, good cars are undervalued and poor cars overvalued.  
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Given the third parties’ uncertainties about the quality of the company, the lemon, 
managers have the opportunity to reduce the uncertainty by disclosing the set of 
information that they believe will respond to the demand from the interested par-
ties, or alternatively, maintain the information advantage that they have over the 
external investors. According to the signaling theory it is the good firms’ manag-
ers’ aim to help investors identify good companies from bad. As in the car exam-
ple, if investors cannot distinguish between these two types of companies, inves-
tors tend to treat both types as averages, i.e. that they are not good but not bad 
either. As a consequence, investors will “undervalue” the good companies and 
“overvalue” the bad companies. This will lead to inefficiencies in the markets. 
However, the presence of financial reporting and independent auditor’s assurance 
managements’ incentives to make “overly optimistic” disclosures in their finan-
cial statements will be reduced. 
Because of rational expectations the agent usually has incentives to publish the 
accounting figures. Accounting numbers are frequently used by owners to moni-
tor whether contractual obligations have been met and to restrict managers’ power 
to promote personal interests (Watts and Zimmerman 1979). However, financial 
reporting of accounting numbers is not usually considered an information system 
for managers, since the company’s internal management accounting is assumed to 
capture the company’s actual financial position for the purposes of management 
(Ng 1978). 
Adverse selection and moral hazard are problems that arise from information 
asymmetry. Both of them are particularly related to the incentives and monitoring 
problem. Soltani (2007) summarizes that in the adverse selection problem the 
principal is able to observe the agent’s behavior but not the performance. This 
may be a result of weak proxies measuring the quality of the performance. If the 
performance of the agent cannot be or is improperly measured, there is an in-
creased likelihood that the agent’s performance will be below expectations. Moral 
hazard refers to the situation where the agent may have, thanks to information 
asymmetry, an incentive to act inefficiently (not in the interest of the principal) if 
the interests of the agent and the principal are not aligned. The situation may arise 
when the principal is not able to monitor the agent’s behavior, but is able to judge 
the outcome, i.e. the quality of work performed based on a chosen measure. How-
ever the agent may modify his behavior towards only striving to fulfill the meas-
ures, being at the same time unconcerned about whether the behavior is actually 
what the principal desires. 
Accounting and auditing are essential factors in monitoring the agency relation-
ship. Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that the need for financial reporting and dis-
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closure arises from information asymmetry and conflict of interests between man-
agers and outside shareholders. Furthermore, the credibility of management dis-
closures is enhanced by regulation, auditing and capital market intermediaries 
(Healy et al. 2001). Accounting numbers are of little value unless they are pre-
pared according to generally accepted standards (regulation) and unless compli-
ance with these standards is monitored (auditing).  Therefore, the role of auditing 
is associated with both conflict of interests and information asymmetry and thus it 
has indeed a significant role in monitoring agency contracts.  
A unique feature in financial reporting is that the owner does not have full control 
over what accounting information system is being applied and what will be re-
ported (Ng 1978). However, the generally accepted accounting principles guide to 
a certain extent the methods chosen by the manager and the existence of external 
auditing examines the application of these principals, but ultimately within those 
limitations the manager still decides, based on his/her own interests, what to re-
port and at what frequency (Ng 1978). 
As pointed out by Lennox et al. (2006), managers disclose value relevant infor-
mation to owners and investors to reduce the information asymmetry. A reduction 
in information asymmetry increases the liquidity in the company’s stock and re-
duces the cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). Verrecchia (2001) uses 
a definition “information asymmetry component of the cost of capital”, by which 
he means the discount that e.g. the company provides to investors to accommo-
date the adverse selection problem, when there exists different degrees of in-
formedness. A reduction in information asymmetry also reduces the opportunity 
to profit from informed trading (Diamond 1985). Information asymmetry can be 
reduced primarily by increasing disclosure activity (Verrecchia 2001; Brown, 
Hillegeist and Lo 2004). 
Costs incurred from principals’ monitoring actions are one component of agency 
costs (Jensen et al. 1976). Monitoring costs in a company accrue when there is a 
difference between owners’ and managers’ interests. Since less monitoring is re-
quired when owners’ and managers’ interests are aligned, Jensen (1986) sug-
gested that agency costs are lower for companies with high levels of management 
ownership. Studies show that audit fees, as a part of monitoring costs, are higher 
for companies with lower management ownership (e.g. Gul et al. 2001; Nikkinen 
et al. 2004). Similarly, Chow (1982) finds some support for the view that the level 
of agency problems is positively related to demand for auditing and later Fan et 
al. (2005) find that agency problems affect the likelihood of companies employ-
ing brand name auditors (Big 5 -auditors). 
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Information asymmetries between the company and the investors can also be 
mitigated if the company has a richer information environment. Information envi-
ronment refers to the amount and the quality of company and market-specific 
information available for investors. Information for decision-making may be ga-
thered from various accounting and non-accounting sources. The primary sources 
of information are the regulated disclosures of the company. One purpose of dis-
closure regulation is indeed the reduction of the information gap between the 
company and its investors and between informed and uninformed investors (Hea-
ly et al. 2001).  
In addition to the company disclosures, the richness of the information environ-
ment is affected by private information production and disclosure. There are at 
least two significant sources in addition to the company that produce and disclose 
information: analysts and news agencies. The disclosure regulation imposes more 
strict disclosure requirements on larger companies. And additionally, as public 
interest is greater in larger companies, the analysts and news agencies concentrate 
their information production on these. As a consequence, large companies have 
on average a richer information environment. 
Recent evidence documents that the richer information environment of larger 
companies constrains managements’ abilities to behave opportunistically, e.g. in 
managing abnormal accruals (Mitra et al. 2005). The profitability and the fre-
quency of insider trades, both of which proxy for information asymmetry and 
private information, are documented to have a negative relationship with analyst 
following and company size, and the informativeness of accounting information 
reduces the frequency of insider trades (Frankel and Li 2004; Ryan 2005). 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) suggest that informed trading and analysts 
forecasting activity all affect the amount of disclosure information that is 
impounded in the share prices, but the type of information that they impound 
depends on each party’s information advantage. Insiders and institutions 
incorporate company-specific information, while analysts convey industry-level 
information. All in all, this evidence indicates that the richness of the information 
environment is effective in reducing information asymmetries and constraining 
management’s opportunistic behavior. 
Finally, information environment is also documented to affect the information 
content of SEC filings. Disclosure information such as SEC filings that are value 
relevant causes investors to revise their expectations concerning discount rates 
and future free cash flows. However, Callen et al. (2006) find that SEC filings (a 
financial statement or other formal document submitted  to the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission) contain less value relevant information at the SEC filing 
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date for companies with a higher proportion of long-term sophisticated investors. 
This is consistent with the perception that sophisticated investors are likely to 
produce their own and use information disclosed by other sources to assess the 
company before the SEC filings become available. In other words, in a richer in-
formation environment sophisticated investors are able to anticipate forthcoming 
disclosures. 
3.5 Agency costs of debt 
The benefits and costs of debt financing have been discussed in the literature for a 
long time. Jensen et al. (1976), Myers (1977) and Smith et al. (1979) suggest that 
the interests of shareholders and bondholders conflict over the companies invest-
ment and financing decisions. The typical conflict is that the bondholders appre-
hend that if not limited, the shareholders expropriate wealth from the bondholders 
by investing in projects that are riskier than the current projects. While sharehold-
ers capture most of the gains if such actions pay off, the bondholders bear most of 
the risks in case of failure (Jensen et al. 1976).  
Bondholders have the option to limit the opportunistic behavior when engaging 
themselves in a debt contract. This can be done by insisting on increased monitor-
ing (Jensen et al. 1976), writing restricting covenants (Smith et al. 1979), shorten-
ing the maturity time of debt (Myers 1977), demanding a higher interest rate 
(Bergman and Callen 1991) or demanding financial reporting conservatism (Ah-
med et al. 2002). The costs of debt can be summarized to consist of two compo-
nents: (i) the loss in company value due to suboptimal investment decisions and 
(ii) the contracting costs that the company uses to mitigate the shareholder-
bondholder conflicts (Billett, King and Mauer 2007).  
Shareholder-bondholder conflicts are likely to increase as the probability of debt 
payments diminishes. Bodie and Taggart (1978) show that underinvestment will 
increase during periods of financial distress because covenants will start increas-
ing the payments from new investments’ value to bondholders when default 
seems more likely. Beatty et al. (2008) provide evidence that as the probability of 
default increases lenders are more likely to demand financial reporting conserva-
tism and conservative contract modifications. Similarly, Billett et al. (2007) find 
that more restricting covenants are increasingly used to control shareholder-
bondholder conflicts in leveraged and growth companies, and less restricting co-
venants when the proportion of short-term debt is higher. 
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Several studies have examined the relationship between management monitoring 
and agency costs of debt. Agency costs of debt are likely to be lower when man-
agement discipline and direct monitoring are higher. Agrawal and Mandelker 
(1982) suggest that the monitoring imposed by capital markets and contractual 
methods both may help discipline managers and avoid expropriation of share-
holder or bondholder wealth, and therefore align the interests of management and 
shareholders/bondholders. Ertugrul et al. (2008) find that increasing the board 
members’ incentives for more effective monitoring will discipline managers, de-
crease agency problems and thus result in decreased bond yield spreads. Ander-
son, Mansi and Reeb (2003) show that ownership structure is associated with 
agency costs of debt. In detail, they find that founding family companies have 
such organizational structures, which generate strong incentives for commitment 
of management to the company and the family to monitor the company, and this 
also protects the interests of bondholders. 
Finally, there is considerable evidence that accounting information quality and 
quantity affects the debt financing conditions. Accounting information quality 
affects the information risk of bondholders and is therefore expected to affect debt 
financing. Sengupta (1998) finds a relationship between analyst-based evaluations 
of aggregate disclosure efforts and cost of debt. Francis et al. (2005) report that 
companies with lower accounting quality have higher interest expenses and lower 
debt ratings than companies with higher accounting quality. Bharath et al. (2008) 
find that the accounting quality affects the choice of debt market (private vs. pub-
lic), with lower accounting quality companies preferring private debt (i.e. bank 
loans). Additionally, Bharath et al. (2008) report that in private markets the ac-
counting quality affects the price as well as the maturity and covenants, whereas 
in the public debt the price is more likely to be affected.  

				
	
DQ 1. Apart from the relationship between management and owners, think of 
every-day-life examples, where “agency-relationships” exist. 
DQ 2. Let us imagine that you import used cars from Estonia to Finland (some 
sources claim that you can gain profits by doing so). Potential customers in Fin-
land may think that these cars are of inferior quality. How could you decrease the 
information asymmetry related to the quality of the cars you are selling? 
DQ3. If management decides not to contract an auditor, what are the advantages 
and disadvantages that this decision may result? 
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4 DEMAND AND SUPPLY FOR FINANCIAL 
INFORMATION 
 
 
 
	


1. Understand why investors and third parties need financial information. 
2. Understand the benefits for management of disclosing information. 
3. Understand the forces that affect decisions concerning mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures. 
4. Understand the three objectives of financial information. 
  
 
Financial accounting information, including the audit report, is useful if it helps 
the users in their decision making. Useful information has at least the following 
three characteristics: quality, relevance and timeliness.  
Quality of the information typically implies that the information has been gener-
ated in accordance with generally accepted principles, such as IAS in accounting 
or ISA in auditing, for example. Relevance of the information suggests that in-
formation should be useful in making a particular decision, as, for example, an 
investor and bank loan manager require different information for accurate deci-
sions. Timeliness of information indicates that the information is current and fu-
ture events are dealt with according to generally accepted principles. Naser, Nu-
seibeh and Al-Hussaini (2003) found that credibility and timeliness are the most 
important features of useful information. 
Financial accounting information has two major purposes. First, financial ac-
counting is a way to transfer information from managers to interested parties ex-
ternal to a company, reducing the information asymmetry between internal and 
external parties. Information asymmetry indicates that managers have access to 
information that people outside the company do not have. Financial accounting 
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provides a way for managers to communicate private information to interested 
parties that do not otherwise have access to it. Access to financial information 
helps interested parties make more accurate assessments of the company. Second, 
financial accounting information is often used in contracts between the company 
and other parties such as lenders, managers, business partners, government etc. 
Basing contracts on accounting information computed with generally accepted 
accounting principles helps reduce the cost of contracting by reducing risk. 
(Guenther 2005) 
Privately owned companies differ from publicly owned companies in their owner-
ship, governance, financing, management, and compensation structures. These 
differences affect the demand and supply of financial information in privately and 
publicly owned companies. In publicly owned companies, the demand for finan-
cial reporting arises from reducing information asymmetry between managers and 
other parties, e.g. investors. Tax, dividend, compensation and payment policies 
affect the demand for financial reporting in privately owned companies. The 
ownership in privately owned companies is typically more concentrated and 
shareholders have a more active role in management. Therefore, it could be ex-
pected that private companies are more likely to communicate privately with 
shareholders, creditors, employees and other interested parties than are publicly 
owned companies. However, no empirical evidence on this is available. It is pro-
posed that the demand for public financial reporting quality is reduced in private 
companies (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). Conversely, higher quality financial re-
porting is demanded from publicly owned companies. 
Ball et al. (2005) expect higher demand for financial reporting quality in publicly 
owned companies to be a consequence of the higher legal obligations of managers 
and auditors and higher risk of litigation. In private companies reducing informa-
tion asymmetry is not the primary goal. Tax, dividend and compensation policies 
are more important in private companies as the flexibility of accounting rules can 
be utilized to benefit the smaller group of interested parties. Ball et al. (2005) 
show that insider access and high quality financial reporting are substitutes for 
reducing information asymmetry and they expect private and publicly owned 
companies to follow a similar pattern. 
It is important to recognize that financial disclosures can be divided into two sets: 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures. Mandatory financial disclosures include all 
regulated filings, e.g. financial statements, footnotes, etc. The extent and timing 
of mandatory disclosures are affected by laws and guidelines from authorities. 
Voluntary disclosures can be seen as a means for management to increase com-
munication with the third parties. Examples of voluntary disclosures include 
26      Proceedings of the University of Vaasa. Teaching Aid Series 
management forecasts, press releases, websites and analysts’ presentations. Fi-
nancial information about a company may be acquired also from other sources 
than the company. For example, financial analysts and financial press regularly 
communicate financial information about companies to their audience (see e.g. 
Soltani 2007, for further discussion).  
Figure 3 illustrates forces that affect the supply of financial information. The sup-
ply of mandatory financial disclosures is mainly influenced by regulatory forces 
and capital market forces. The financial reporting standards set the minimum re-
quirements for annual reports, whereas capital markets impact, more or less, to 
what extent management discloses voluntarily, i.e. more than required by regula-
tion. The same principle applies also for the timing of the disclosures, regulation 
set the boundaries, while the market rewards companies that are able or willing to 
make more timely disclosures.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Forces affecting supply of financial information (Soltani 2007). 
 
Soltani (2007) divides the objectives of financial reporting into three factors. 
First, financial reporting provides information for the users business and eco-
nomic decisions. Users can be divided into internal (management and directors) 
and external (owners, lenders, employees, suppliers, clients etc.). It is important 
to remember that although the internal users have the benefit of using manage-
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ment accounting information as a source, the financial statements that are pro-
duced quarterly or annually contain a significant amount of additional information 
as well. The second objective of financial reporting is to help investors predict 
future cash flows. According to finance theory, the stock price of the company 
represents the net present value of future cash flows. The information about cash 
flows is important, since cash flows affect companies’ abilities to continue as a 
going concern and pay interests and dividends. Because future cash flows are not 
known, investors use disclosed and undisclosed information to produce estimates 
of future cash flows. The richer and reliable the disclosed financial information 
(mandatory and voluntary) is, the more accurate estimations the investors can 
make. The third objective of financial information is to provide information con-
cerning the company’s economic resources, the claims to the resources (obliga-
tions) and the effects of transactions and events that may affect the existence of 
the resources and claims to them. 
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DQ 1. What advantages and disadvantages are involved for the management from 
disclosing financial information? 
DQ 2. In what sense are the different third parties of a company differently af-
fected by the extent and quality of disclosed information (hint: think of the differ-
ent amount of resources available and/or access to information etc. 
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5 THE DEMAND FOR AUDITING 
 
 
	


 
1. Recognize the different parties demanding auditing 
 
2. Understand the factors affecting the demand for auditing 
  
3. Understand why all interested parties are not capable off or able to do the 
audit themselves. 
 
 
Contracts between principals and agents will not reduce the costs of conflicts un-
less the parties can determine whether the contract has been breached. Therefore 
there is a natural demand for monitoring (Watts et al. 1986a). The literature sug-
gests that accounting plays an important role in contract terms and monitoring 
these terms. This establishes the demand for accounting. Reporting of accounting 
figures, i.e. financial reporting, represents an information system to the owner 
(Ng 1978).  
It should be noted, however, that financial reporting does not add any (or not 
much) information to the manager, because management is assumed to have an 
information advantage over the external third parties, and be able to observe the 
company’s performance through the internal management accounting information 
(Ng 1978). Accounting numbers are used e.g. in lending agreements between the 
companies and their financers. These agreements often include covenants which 
are tied to financial statement ratios. Also, management compensation and bonus 
plans are another example where accounting numbers are used to measure man-
agement performance. (Watts et al. 1986a) 
Moreover, it is important to recognize that management produced financial re-
ports alone do not solve the agency problems that are due to information asymme-
try or conflict of interests. Because management is responsible for reporting on 
the financial condition of the company, management is also in a position to adjust 
the figures if the owner is not able to directly observe the actions. Thus there is 
always an information risk present when financial information is made available 
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to the owners. Figure 4 specifies the third parties demanding financial statement 
information.  
Auditing plays an important role in monitoring contracts and reducing the infor-
mation risk (Watts et al. 1986b). Without an external audit the accounting infor-
mation used for decision-making by several internal and external parties lacks 
credibility. Therefore the most important requirement of the external audit is to 
increase the credibility of financial statements generated from accounting infor-
mation (Lee 1972). Principals contract auditors to view the accounting numbers, 
procedures used in compensation and bonus plans and any breaches of contracts 
(Watts et al. 1986a). The increased credibility of the financial information poten-
tially benefits both owners and management.  
Figure 4.  Third parties demanding financial statement information (e.g. Soltani 
2007) 
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Figure 5, as illustrated by Eilifsen et al. 2006, provides an overview of how the 
agency relationship is creating the demand for auditing. Information asymmetry 
creates a need for an independent intermediary, the auditor, to verify and provide 
assurance of financial reports prepared by the management. Without the verifica-
tion of the auditor managers would have an incentive to misrepresent the per-
formance of the company and their management skills, since they could gain pri-
vate benefits by such actions.   
The purpose of auditing, as Littleton (1933) pointed out in an early view, was “to 
verify the honesty of persons charged with fiscal rather than managerial responsi-
bilities”. At this time auditing was associated with monitoring government offi-
cials. Audits were designed to check upon accountability and stewardship (Little-
ton 1933).  Later, Flint (1988) described auditing as “a social control mechanism 
for securing accountability”. The view of auditing as a mechanism in securing 
stewardship and accountability of the agents has remained.  
 
 
Figure 5.  Overview of the principal-agent relationshio leading to the demand 
for auditing (Eilifsen et al. 2006) 
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5.1  Four conditions creating the demand for auditing 
The American Accounting Association’s (AAA) Committee on Basic Auditing 
Concepts (1973) summarized the criteria that create the demand for auditing: 
 
1. The potential or actual conflict of interest. 
2. Consequences of errors 
3. Complexity. 
4. Remoteness. 
First, as previously discussed, the demand for auditing may arise from the exis-
tence of conflict of interest between the preparer of the information and the user. 
This situation may cause the information to be biased, i.e. the manager is allowed 
to choose the method, extent and timing of the reporting. This may make the qual-
ity of information suspect and necessitate an independent review of the informa-
tion, an audit.  
Two sources of conflict of interests may be identified related to corporate report-
ing, deliberate and unintentional. First, management may deliberately prepare and 
disclose biased information to pursue personal interests. For example, manage-
ment compensation plans are typically based on reported earnings or some other 
financial performance measures, which are usually derived from financial state-
ments. Management may thus have an incentive to disclose biased information 
which helps in reaching targets set by the shareholders. Second, unintentional bias 
in financial information could exist if management, without realizing, attempts to 
satisfy the needs of one outside interest group at the expense of the others. The 
manager may satisfy the interests of their creditors (banks) to gain favorable loan 
terms or to meet the debt covenants. Alternatively, management may strive to 
satisfy the needs of significant owners, at the expense of other owners. One main 
objective of auditing is to ensure unbiased reporting which could benefit one in-
terest group at the expense of the others. 
Second, the demand for auditing may also be attributed to the significant eco-
nomic, social or other consequences of users’ erroneous decisions. To increase 
the quality of their decision making, investors need reliable and complete infor-
mation. The audit function adds to the credibility of the underlying information 
and, as a consequence, users may rely more on the information and make more 
accurate evaluations.  
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Third, both accounting and preparation of financial statements are becoming more 
and more complex. Similarly, the interpretation of financial statements also re-
quires thorough understanding of accounting and reporting practices, business 
processes governance issues and institutional settings. Users are therefore finding 
it more and more difficult (or even impossible) to evaluate the quality of financial 
statements and interpret the signals of the disclosures. Complexity of the report-
ing process may also increase the risk of unintentional errors due to the lack 
knowledge of the preparer. Furthermore, the average user of financial information 
(e.g. an average amateur private investor) is not knowledgeable enough to fully 
understand financial reports, much less detect possible intentional or unintentional 
errors. The auditor is hired to provide users an assessment of the quality of the 
information. 
Fourth, typically the users of financial statements do not have, due to legal and 
institutional barriers) direct access to the accounting records from which financial 
statements are prepared. Furthermore, if the accounting records would be made 
available for assessment, time and cost constraints normally prevent users from 
making a meaningful investigation. Remoteness prevents users from directly “au-
diting” the financial statements themselves. Due to these restrictions users must 
rely on a third party, the audit firm, to assist them in assessing the quality of fi-
nancial information, or accept the quality of the financial data in good faith. 
The committee (American Accounting Association 1973) considered that these 
four conditions interact in such a way that as they increase in intensity they form 
the demand for auditing.  Conditions 2–4 are based on the theory of rational ex-
pectations. The concept of rational expectations assumes that people take into 
account all available information that influences the outcome of their decisions. 
Further, it expects people to utilize their information intelligently and therefore 
they do not systematically make mistakes (i.e. they learn from the past). This 
means that principals will not be consistently misled by agents. (Wallace 1980) 
The implication of rational expectations theory for agents is that principals will: 
1. expect agents’ self-interests to diverge from the principals’ interests 
2. be able to estimate the effect of such divergence 
3. adjust prices (e.g. compensation offered) to reflect the related costs of the 
agents’ expected activities. 
The ability of principals to protect themselves through an adjustment of prices 
generates the agents’ demand for monitoring activities. The agents rather than the 
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principals can be seen as the source of demand for monitoring. Principals are ba-
sically unconcerned, because they can protect themselves from the risk of loss by 
reducing compensation for the agent’s services. Agents demand monitoring in 
order to avoid the downward adjustment of their compensation. (Wallace 1980) 
The committee of the American Accounting Association (1973) concluded that it 
becomes increasingly important that an informed, independent conclusion is 
reached by the user as to the quality of the accounting information received. Fur-
thermore, it is increasingly difficult for the user of the information to reach an 
informed, independent conclusion without outside assistance (American Account-
ing Association 1973). 
5.2  Evidence on factors affecting the demand for 
auditing  
 The monitoring of an agent can assume a variety of forms: owner-manager in-
volvement, contingent compensation or bonus plans, periodic reports on perform-
ance etc. (Wallace 1980). Beaver (1989) suggests that one means to align the in-
terests of management and shareholders is to use profit-sharing agreements or 
stock options as incentive contracts. The primary means for continuous perform-
ance reporting is a set of a company's financial statements (Wallace 1980). Sub-
stantial evidence exists that earnings announcements by companies result in stock 
price adjustments (Ball and Brown 1968) or that accounting information is related 
to the market value of a corporation's shares (Beaver 1968), and that accounting 
ratios can be used to estimate the probability of bankruptcy (Beaver 1966) and the 
risk of owning a company's stock (Beaver, Kettler and Scholes 1970). 
These facts suggest that reported earnings have information content (Foster 1978) 
and are useful in the assessment of an agent's performance. The use of accounting 
information in management compensation and bond indenture contracts (Smith, 
Clifford and Warner 1979) demonstrates the use of reported earnings in perform-
ance evaluation. From the discussion on agency theory and the implications of 
rational expectations, incentives clearly exist for agents to provide financial 
statements to assist monitoring activities by principals (Wallace 2004).  
However, if the principals do not trust the numbers provided by an agent they will 
insist on compensation (through adjustment of the agent's wage) for the risk of 
loss they perceive. Evidence exists that restatements of accounting numbers pro-
vided result in stock price adjustments (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz 2004) 
and lower earnings response coefficient (Livnat and Tan 2004). This implies that 
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when accounting numbers are found to be inaccurate, the investors’ trust in ac-
counting numbers will be impaired for future periods.  
Therefore, in light of the above-mentioned factors the agent will, in addition to 
providing financial reports, agree to provide evidence that the reported numbers 
were carefully prepared and free from material errors. External auditing is the 
product which provides this assurance, taking into account the limitations of au-
diting on detecting material errors. (Wallace 1980 and 1987) 
The audit literature has acknowledged that agency costs, caused by information 
asymmetry and conflict of interest are positively related to the demand for high 
quality auditing. Francis and Wilson (1988) find that agency costs affect the 
choice of a higher quality brand name (“Big 8”) auditor.  Similarly, DeFond 
(1992) finds that changes in agency costs are associated with changes in audit 
quality. However, Nichols and Smith (1983) do not find a positive abnormal stock 
market reaction to companies’ announcements of switching to higher quality 
auditors. Both Francis et al. (1988) and DeFond (1992) explain that companies 
have different demands for audit quality based on the alignment of interests be-
tween the management and the owners. The divergence of interests consists of 
conflict of interests and information asymmetry and the degree of these determine 
the degree of auditing needed. Auditing is understood to make the management 
more credible to investors either in the absence of or in addition to other means to 
control agency conflicts.  
Blouin, Grein and Rountree (2007) study two determinants of auditor selection, 
switching costs and agency costs. Blouin et al. (2007) used the collapse of Arthur 
Andersen to examine the effects of the client company losing the agency benefits 
inherent in the relationship with the auditor. Client companies are perceived to 
have lost their agency benefits due to the reduction in perceived audit quality of 
Arthur Andersen, which has been documented in several studies (e.g. Chaney and 
Piplich 2002; Krishnamurthy, Zhou and Zhou 2006). Blouin et al. (2007) found 
that companies with higher agency problems were more likely to start a new audit 
relationship instead of following the incumbent Arthur Andersen audit team to the 
audit firm that took over the operations of Arthur Andersen. Accordingly, this 
further confirms that auditing is an important means of reducing agency costs and 
therefore the companies’ agency problems are a key determinant in the auditor 
selection process.  
In some later studies, the effect of divergence of interests on the informativeness 
of earnings was first studied by Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995). They find that 
managerial ownership is positively related to informativeness of earnings on the 
stock markets and negatively related to the magnitude of discretionary accruals. 
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The reasoning behind this is that as the demand for accounting-based manage-
ment constraints is higher when management ownership is lower, management is 
expected to respond to this in their self-interest. The study of Warfield et al. 
(1995) was extended by Yeo, Tan, Ho and Chen (2002) as they show that at 
higher levels of management ownership the informativeness of earnings does not 
have a positive relationship with management ownership, but the relationship has 
reversed. This would suggest that the entrenchment effect becomes effective at 
high levels of management ownership.  
However, Gul, Lynn and Tsui (2002) develop the study by Warfield et al. (1995) 
by looking at how audit quality affects the positive relationship between the in-
formativeness of earnings and management ownership and the negative associa-
tion between discretionary accruals and management ownership. The results of 
Gul et al. (2002) support the conclusion that agency problems have an effect on 
the demand for auditing. 
The audit fee literature has also extended the findings of Warfield et al. (1995) 
and Yeo et al. (2002). Gul, Chen and Tsui (2003) find that management owner-
ship weakens the positive relationship between discretionary accruals and audit 
fees; however, in companies with high accounting-based management compensa-
tion the negative effect of management ownership is found to be weaker. The 
audit fee literature proposes that there is a relationship between agency problems 
and audit fees (see Hay, Knechel and Wong 2006 for a review). The relationship 
is expected to be positive, because of the auditor’s increased exposure to liability.  
Consistent with this, Gul et al. (1998) finds first that for low growth companies 
the positive relationship between free cash flow and audit fees is weaker for com-
panies with high debt. Later, Gul et al. (2001) added that like debt, management 
ownership also affects the positive relationship between audit fees and free cash 
flow. Finally, Nikkinen et al. (2004) report that management ownership has a 
negative effect and free cash flow a positive effect on audit fees and thus the 
agency costs can be used to some extent in explaining audit fees. The studies by 
Gul et al. (1998, 2001) and Nikkinen et al. (2004) further support the theory that 
the agency costs of the company have an effect on the demand and supply of au-
dit services. 
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
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DQ1. This chapter describes the demand for auditing from the perspective of fi-
nancial information quality. What other benefits, besides an assessment of the 
quality of the financial information, does the audit provide for the interested par-
ties of a firm? 
 
DQ2. There has been a discussion concerning the audit exemption thresholds in 
different countries. From the point of view of the “public interest”, how are high 
vs. low thresholds motivated? 
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6  THE RELEVANCE OF AUDIT REPORTS 
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1. Provide examples from academic research on the relevance of auditors 
reporting 
 
2. Understand why audit reports could affect stock returns 
 
3. Provide a review of the academic research concerning audit reports and 
stock markets 
 
4. Understand the difference between “normal” audit reports, i.e. those on 
financial statements, and audit reports on the effectiveness of internal con-
trols. 
 
5. Provide a review of the academic literature concerning whether audit re-
ports affect the decision making process of users. 
 
 
6.1 Market reactions to audit report announcements 
The first approach in studying the information content of audit opinions is the 
capital market approach. This line of research studies the relevance of information 
contained in audit opinions by analyzing the direct stock market reaction to audit 
opinion or indirectly the market reaction to audit opinion related announcements.  
Considerable evidence supports the simultaneous or delayed correlation between 
earnings information and stock price changes (Ball et al. 1968; Bernard and Tho-
mas 1989; Jegadeesh and Livnat 2006). However, as Lev (1989) reports, earnings 
explain only a fraction of the change in returns on the earnings announcement 
date. Due to this, accounting research explored models with other financial in-
formation (Ou and Penman 1989; Livnat and Zarowin 1990; Sloan 1996). One 
such source of information is the audit report. Audit reports have the potential to 
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change the market responsiveness to earnings by adding noise or reducing the 
persistency of reported earnings (Choi and Jeter 1992).  
The audit report can be expected to potentially affect stock prices mainly for two 
reasons. First, the audit report may contain information that affects either the es-
timation of the magnitude of future cash flows and/or the riskiness of future cash 
flows. Any information that can result in revisions of these components is rele-
vant to the stock prices. Second, the audit report can contain substantial informa-
tion about the viability of the company, e.g. the going concern audit report. The 
report should at all times reflect the auditor’s access to inside information such as 
forecast data and management plans, and, taking this into account, the auditor’s 
reporting decision also reveals some private information (Mutchler 1984). How-
ever, Mutchler (1985) explains that e.g. the going concern audit report is a func-
tion of publicly available information, and suggests that such reports can be pre-
dicted.  
Melumad and Ziv (1997) proposed in their theoretical model of market reactions 
to qualified audit reports that the reaction to avoidable and unavoidable qualified 
audit reports is different. An avoidable audit report, which the management could 
have avoided by making a change in reporting, could result in either a positive or 
a negative reaction. Whereas an unavoidable qualified audit report, which the 
management could not have avoided, is expected to result in a negative reaction. 
The reaction of financial markets to audit report announcements has been exten-
sively studied in the accounting literature. The fundamental question addressed in 
these empirical studies is whether the audit reports affect investors’ pricing deci-
sions. A list of the most relevant studies for this dissertation is presented in Table 
1. 
 
Audit reports on financial statements 
The event date problem becomes evident when the event date selection in the lit-
erature is reviewed. The first observation is that several studies have used a 
choice of dates. This is illustrated by how e.g. Loudder et al. (1992) describe their 
sample selection: “The qualification disclosure date was defined as the earliest of 
(1) the publication date of a media story, if one was found, (2) the annual report 
date, or (3) the 10-K stamp date”. Multiple event dates have also been used by 
several other studies and this is clearly an indication of the difficulty to identify or 
determine the first day of trade on the information contained in the audit opinion. 
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In the U.S. studies the most frequently used announcement date is the form 10-K 
(10-K) filing date (see e.g. Chow et al. 1982, Ameen et al. 1994, Carlson et al. 
1998). Traded companies must file their annual reports with the SEC on the 10-K. 
The problem with this report and event date is that the 10-K provides in addition 
an overview of the companies’ business and financial condition. This means that 
a large amount of information is released on that particular day, of which the 
audit opinion information is only a part.  
Another frequently applied announcement date is the media disclosure date (e.g. 
Dopuch et al. 1986, Loudder et al. 1992, Fleak et al. 1994). The choice of this 
event date may resolve may of the problems with concurrent other information 
releases associated with the 10-K date, because there is no concurrent announce-
ment from the company at that point in time. The media disclosure date may also 
in many cases be earlier than the 10-K filing and, as stated earlier, it is essential to 
identify the first day trade takes place with the audit report information. The prob-
lem with the media disclosure date is that for research purposes there are so few 
observations. 
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Table 1.  Studies on the relevance of audit reports in the stock markets. 
 
Authors Year Journal* Observed 
market 
Audit reports on financial statements: 
Baskin 1972 TAR U.S. 
Firth 1978 TAR U.K. 
Chow and Rice   1982 AJPT U.S. 
Banks and Kinney 1982 JAR U.S. 
Davis 1982 AJPT U.S. 
Elliot 1982 JAR U.S. 
Dodd, Dopuch, Holthausen and 
Leftwich 
1984 JAE U.S. 
Dopuch, Holthausen and Leftwich 1986 JAE U.S. 
Fields and Wilkins 1991 AJPT U.S. 
Choi and Jeter 1992 JAE U.S. 
Loudder, Khurana, Sawyers, Cor-
dery, Johnson, Lowe and Wunderle 
1992 AJPT U.S. 
Mittelstaedt, Regier, Chewning and 
Pany 
1992 AJPT U.S. 
Ameen, Chan and Guffey 1994 JBFA U.S. 
Fleak and Wilson 1994 JAAF U.S. 
Frost 1994 AJPT U.S. 
Chen and Church 1996 TAR U.S. 
Jones 1996 JAPP U.S. 
Carlson, Glenzen and Benefield 1998 QJBE U.S. 
Fargher and Wilkins 1998 JBFA U.S. 
Chen, Su and Zhao 2000 CAR China 
Holder-Webb and Wilkins 2000 JAR U.S. 
Soltani 2000 IJA France 
Schaub and Highfield 2003 JAM U.S. 
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Table 1.  Continued 
 
Authors Year Journal* Observed 
market 
Pucheta, Vico and Garcia 2004 EAR Spain 
Taffler, Lu and Kausar 2004 JAE U.K. 
Ogneva and Subramanyam 2007 JAE U.K./U.S./  
A t li  
Herbohn, Ragunathan, Garsden 2007 AF Australia 
Kausar, Taffler and Tan 2009 JAR U.S. 
   
Audit reports on internal control weaknesses:   
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney and 
LaFond 
2009 JAR U.S. 
Ittonen 2010 MAJ U.S. 
Ogneva, Subramanyam and Raghu-
nandan 
2007 TAR U.S. 
Beneish, Billings and Hodder 2008 TAR U.S. 
Hammersley, Myers and Shakespeare 2008 RAST U.S. 
* AF= Accounting and Finance, AJPT= Auditing: a Journal of Practice 
and Theory, CAR= Contemporary Accounting Research, EAR= European 
Accounting Review, IJA= International Journal of Auditing, JAAF= 
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, JAE= Journal of Account-
ing and Economics, JAM= Journal of Asset Management, JAPP= Journal 
of Accounting and Public Policy, JAR= Journal of Accounting Research, 
JBFA= Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, MAJ=Managerial 
Auditing JournalQJBE= Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 
RAST= Review in Accounting Studies, TAR= The Accounting Review. 
 
 
In an Australian setting Herbohn et al. (2007) study the market reactions on the 
date of the final annual report. They recognize that Australian companies were 
required first to release a preliminary annual report with the earnings information 
and later they publicize the final annual report. Herbohn et al. (2007) are thus able 
to restrict the influence of earnings information from the abnormal returns on the 
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day of the final annual report. However, as they note, the final annual reports may 
still contain amendments to the earnings or other relevant non-earnings informa-
tion and, furthermore, the preliminary report may already contain information that 
creates an expectation of a going concern audit report, which would reduce the 
reaction on the final annual report announcement date. 
Moreover, Loudder et al. (1992), Fleak et al. (1994), Ameen et al. (1994), Carlson 
et al. (1998) among others use the annual report announcement day in their analy-
sis. This event date can be regarded as the ultimate date when the audit report is 
announced (of course the audit report can later be withdrawn or amended), be-
cause the companies must publish their annual reports and the annual reports must 
contain an audit report.  
Soltani (2000) in his French and Pucheta et al. (2004) in their Spanish study use 
an estimation of the date when the audit report is publicly announced. They both 
use the 15th day before the annual general meeting as the event date. As alterna-
tive event dates, Soltani (2000) also suggests the date of the auditor’s signature on 
the audit report and an average between the date of the auditor’s signature and 15 
days before the general meeting, but results are reported only using the first men-
tioned date. 
More recent studies have proposed means to circumvent the event date -problem. 
Fields et al. (1991) acknowledge that “The main difficulty in most of these prior 
studies was the lack of precision in identifying the date upon which information, 
if any, was revealed to the markets. In their study, Fields et al. (1991) examine the 
share price reactions to public announcements of withdrawn qualifications. The 
withdrawn qualification can be used to measure the information content of audit 
reports in exactly the same way as the underlying audit report is used. The use of 
qualification withdrawals announcements in this line of research can further be 
motivated by the fact that the withdrawals are not anticipated and may therefore 
result in a reaction in the stock prices and that they are more timely and less noisy 
than e.g. 10-K announcement (Fargher et al. 1998). Fargher et al. (1998) examine 
the shifts in systematic risk around the publicly announced qualification with-
drawals. They hypothesized that the announcement of a qualification withdrawal 
would decrease the systematic risk of equity, i.e. the equity beta. 
Chen et al.  (1996) propose another alternative means to avoid the event date -
problem of audit report announcements. They study whether going concern audit 
reports are useful in predicting bankruptcy. They focus on the excess returns in 
the period surrounding bankruptcy filings and find that companies receiving go-
ing concern audit reports experience less negative excess returns around the bank-
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ruptcy filing. A plausible interpretation is that going concern opinions have in-
formation value, at least in the case of bankruptcy. 
Finally, Taffler et al. (2004), Ogneva et al. (2007) and Herbohn et al. (2007) ap-
proach the question of the relevance of audit reports to the stock markets using a 
long-term perspective. This approach is less sensitive to the selection of the event 
date since it examines the stock returns in a 12-month period following the publi-
cation of the going concern audit report. Taffler et al. (2004) find a significant 
reaction in the U.K. following the going concern audit report. Ogneva et al. 
(2007) are unable to find a reaction on the U.S. and Australian markets, whereas 
Herbohn et al. (2007) find in Australia only a significant market reaction in the 
12-month period prior to the going concern report announcement and Kausar et 
al. (2009) demonstrate a significant 12 month stock market reaction to first-time 
going concern audit reports in the U.S. 
 
Audit reports on internal controls 
The passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) Section 302 and Section 404 
changed the requirements for making public disclosures regarding internal con-
trols. In the pre-SOX period there were no requirements for management or audi-
tors regarding disclosures of internal control effectiveness. Prior to SOX (2002) 
companies could voluntarily assess and report on the effectiveness of internal 
controls, but only few did so (see McMullen, Raghunandan and Rama (1996) for 
a review on pre-SOX reporting activity). 
Section 404 of the SOX (2002) requires that public company annual filings (10-
K) contain management’s assessment of the design and the effectiveness of the 
company’s internal controls. Moreover, it also requires the auditor to provide a 
separate opinion on management’s assessment and the auditor’s evaluation of the 
internal controls. The auditors’ reports on internal control deficiencies are usually 
referred to as the auditors’ Section 404 disclosures. Closely related to these re-
ports where the Section 302 reports by the management. Before the implementa-
tion of SOX (2002) Section 404, Section 302 first required management to evalu-
ate the internal controls over financial reporting and report results of their evalua-
tion. Whereas Section 404 reports accompany annual reports, the Section 302 
reports could be filed separately. 
Research on both Section 302 and Section 404 disclosures shows that internal 
control weaknesses are associated with companies that are smaller, financially 
weaker, rapidly growing, more complex, and which have ongoing restructuring 
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(Doyle, Ge and McVay 2007a; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). As expected, weak-
nesses in internal controls are also related to significantly decreased financial 
statement quality. Doyle, Ge and McVay (2007b) and Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, 
Kinney and LaFond (2009) find that internal control weaknesses are associated 
with lower quality accruals. Weaknesses in internal controls can affect the quality 
of financial statements by either allowing more intentional earnings management 
or unintentional errors. The evidence (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008) suggests 
however, that weaknesses are more likely to lead to unintentional errors 
As the evidence of the effect of internal control weaknesses on financial reporting 
quality seems convincing, it is of interest to look closer at the market and capital 
effects of these disclosures. In general, the negative effect of internal control 
weaknesses on financial information quality increases the information risk and 
uncertainty of equity or debt holders. Therefore, investors should demand a high-
er risk premium. Regarding the Section 302 disclosures, there is evidence that 
there is a negative abnormal reaction to the announcement of internal control 
weaknesses (Beneish et al. 2008; Hammersley et al. 2008). However, Beneish et 
al. (2008) report that the auditor quality and client size attenuates the reaction to 
Section 302 disclosures, and Hammersley et al. (2008) find that the reaction de-
pends on the characteristics of the weakness. This evidence suggests first that the 
richness of the information environment may affect the reaction, and secondly 
that specific types of weaknesses are more difficult to anticipate even in a richer 
environment. 
Section 404 reports are filed most commonly with the annual 10-K reports. The 
empirical evidence implies that auditors’ Section 404 internal control weakness 
disclosures are not associated with abnormal returns around the announcement 
(Ogneva et al. 2007; Beneish et al. 2008). Beneish et al. (2008) conclude that the 
information environment of companies that are required to report under Section 
404 is richer and that this attenuates the surprise or that Section 404 reports may 
reflect a low materiality threshold for disclosure. In an additional analysis Bene-
ish et al. (2008) study the cost of capital effects of internal control weakness dis-
closures. They report that Section 302 reports increase the cost of capital, whereas 
Section 404 reports do not. However, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney and 
LaFond (2009) find a significant negative market reaction to Section 404 reports, 
and their cross-sectional test also indicates that the systematic risks are higher for 
companies disclosing internal control weaknesses. 
These studies suggest that disclosed Section 404 internal control weaknesses may 
represent risk that is meaningful to investors. This being so, it would be fair to 
assume that the audit fees are higher for companies with internal control weak-
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nesses. The empirical evidence confirms that companies with weaknesses pay 
higher audit fees (Hoitash, Hoitash and Bedard 2008). 
 
Trading activities of informed market participants 
The literature reviewed above revealed that the event date used in this research is 
the typically the 10-K report filing date. However, as studies on market reactions 
to other company-specific information announcements reveal, the actual date of 
the event may also be a relevant point of time to measure the reactions. For in-
stance, Knechel et al. (2007) and Carter et al. (1999) study the market reactions to 
8-K report announcements around the date of the actual event. In the study of 
Knechel et al. (2007) the event date used was the date of the dismissal of the in-
cumbent auditor, rather than the filing date of 8-K the report indicating that the 
incumbent auditor was dismissed and a new auditor appointed. 
Using the date of the actual event raises an important question. The question is 
why should there be a market reaction before some new information has been 
announced to the stock markets. Generally it is understood that stock prices in-
corporate all relevant publicly available information and companies are required 
to publicly announce all new and relevant information. This implies that before 
the public announcement only some market participants have access and an op-
portunity to use this information. 
Informed market participants are by definition all those traders who are informed 
when an information event occurs at a company. Tookes (2008) informed traders 
as corporate insiders, employees, analysts, and others who have access to infor-
mation before it is released to the market. Piotroski et al. (2004) includes, in addi-
tion to insiders and analytics, also institutional investors with significant owner-
ship as informed market participants. Jayaraman (2008) defines informed traders 
as those who have acquired private information or who have access to private 
information due to his/her association with the company. 
The information advantage of informed market participants is the greatest when 
the precision of public information is lower, information asymmetry between in-
siders and outsiders is greater, uncertainty about the value of the company is 
higher, and the informed traders’ information is more accurate. Tookes (2008) 
proposes also that informed traders have the opportunity to extract higher excess 
returns in small companies’ stock that are less competitive and have higher sensi-
tivity to shocks. Huddart and Ke (2007) find evidence that abnormal returns after 
insiders’ trades are lower for companies with richer information environment. 
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Similarly, Frankel et al. (2004), Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Seyhun (1986), and 
Finnerty (1976) find that the profitability of insider trades is positively related to 
information environment, measured by analyst following or company size. 
Jayaraman (2008) finds that informed trading is more active when public infor-
mation is less informative.  
The literature examining informed or insider trading supports the selection of the 
event date in this dissertation. The content of the audit report is privately available 
when the auditor presents it to the company and publicly available when it is filed 
publicly announced as a part of the 10-K report. The financial literature, however, 
has found considerable evidence of informed trading. In particular, as briefly re-
viewed above, the literature concludes that informed trading is more likely to oc-
cur in smaller companies with less competitive stocks and companies with high 
information asymmetry or poor information environment. This evidence suggests 
that when using the audit report date as the event date, then the effects of informa-
tion asymmetry and information environment need to be controlled for. In addi-
tion, informed market participants have a greater benefit from private information 
when uncertainty about the price of the stock is greater and the private informa-
tion is accurate. In the case of going concern audit reports or internal control 
weakness disclosures, the companies receiving these reports are typically smaller, 
financially distressed or going through restructuring and due to these factors the 
uncertainty around these companies is likely to be high. Thus, the conclusion is 
that the conditions after the audit report date are favorable for informed market 
participants’ trading activities. 
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6.2 Relevance of audit reports in users’ decision 
making 
The professional auditor is assigned by the annual general meeting. This means 
that the auditor works for and reports to the shareholders. However, the target 
group or user group of audit reports can be seen as much broader. External inves-
tors, bank loan officers, authorities, financial analysts, i.e. users of financial 
statements, can all be considered users of audit reports.  
The impact of audit reports on users has been studied over a long period in many 
papers (e.g. Libby 1979; Houghton 1983; Gul 1987; Bamber et al. 1997; LaSalle 
et al. 1997; Lin et al. 2003). This research trend is based on the question of how 
professionals in different positions perceive the information contained in the audit 
opinion to affect the reliability of the financial statement information and their 
decision-making.  
Most of the studies on the relevance of audit reports in user decision-making are 
experiments. In these studies the decision made by the user is monitored when 
he/she is exposed to a specific type of audit report and a scenario of request for 
financing. Guiral-Contreras et al. (2007) divide these studies into three types. The 
first addresses how the level of auditor attestation affects loan officers’ decisions 
(Johnson et al. 1983, Wright et al. 2000). The second type studies how the audit 
report format affects the loan officers’ decision-making processes (Miller et al. 
1993). The third type focuses on differences in the relevance of qualified and un-
qualified audit reports (LaSalle et al 1997, Bessell et al. 2003). 
The experimental method used in this type of research is designed so that the ef-
fect of the auditors’ report on the loan officers’ decision-making process can be 
measured. The results from both earlier studies and more recent studies yield in-
conclusive results regarding the relevance of audit report information in lending 
decisions. According to the findings of Estes and Reimer (1977), Libby (1979), 
Abdel-Khalik, Graul and Newton (1986), Houghton (1983), Bessell et al. (2003) 
and Lin et al. (2003) the audit report does not have an effect on the loan officers’ 
decisions. However, Firth (1979), Gul (1987), Bamber et al. (1997), LaSalle et al. 
(1997), Durendez (2003) and Guiral-Contreras et al. (2007) show that the audit 
report indeed may have an effect on the loan decision. 
Some studies have addressed user groups other than loan officers. Bailey, Bylin-
ski and Shields (1983) experimented with knowledgeable and less knowledgeable 
audit report readers, whereas Robertson (1988) and Durendez (2003) studied fi-
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nancial analysts dealing with financial statement information when making in-
vestment decisions.  
A different stream of research from the previously described is the one that exam-
ines the usefulness of audit reports in predicting bankruptcies. This is an interest-
ing question because one major risk that investors face is the probability of failure 
or bankruptcy. Independent auditors have an obligation to disclose information to 
the investors if they have substantial doubt about the ability of a firm to continue 
to meet its obligations, i.e. to continue as a going concern. This implies that audit-
ing, particularly the going concern audit report, could serve as a warning signal of 
bankruptcy. However, there are several examples of cases, where auditors have 
failed to observe or report serious threats, and therefore, investors relying on audi-
tors abilities to detect threats have been surprised by the problems. 
Research has shown that the audit opinion may provide useful information to the 
investors. In particular, the value of the auditor’s statement stems from the fact 
that the auditor uses information that is not available for third parties and the 
auditor is additionally well informed of the client’s activities and future plans 
(Mutchler 1985; Menon and Schwartz 1987). The literature provides some con-
firmation on the claim that investors find the going concern audit report useful 
(Firth 1979; Campbell and Mutchler 1988) and that the auditor report is a good 
measure of external governance mechanisms (Willenborg and McKeown 2000; 
Fan and Wong 2005). Despite the auditor’s access to private information, some 
studies have shown that statistical models relying on public financial information 
outperform going concern audit reports in predicting bankruptcy and therefore the 
audit report is not valuable for the investors (Altman 1982; Koh and Killough 
1990). These studies also suggest that the auditors should make use of statistical 
models in making decisions. 
50      Proceedings of the University of Vaasa. Teaching Aid Series 
				
	
 
1. Which factors or circumstances could affect how relevant the audit report 
is for the users? 
2. In many experimental studies the researchers conclude that the audit re-
port is important for the decision makers. On the contrary, the observa-
tions from practice suggest that financial statement users rarely even look 
at the audit report. What could be the reason for the divergence between 
the claimed and actual behavior of decision makers? 
3. How could the trading activities of insiders affect the observed market 
reactions to audit reports? 
4. If a decision maker, e.g. a loan officer, does not have an audit report avail-
able because the manager decided not to hire an auditor, how can the loan 
officer compensate the lack of assurance? 
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